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In the summer of 2020, students across the UK received some unusual test results. 
Like many students around the world, they hadn’t been able to sit their A-Level (Year 13) 
exams, thanks to the coronavirus pandemic. Yet, their futures – their places at university or 
further education, and the career and life paths that might follow from these places – still 
depended on grades from the exams they hadn’t taken.  
 
Teachers were instructed to produce predicted grades for the students, and given 
methods by which to do so. Months after having set this predictive method in place, however, 
government regulators got cold feet about it, because of grade inflation. The average 
predicted test scores were higher than the typical yearly averages – perhaps due to factors 
such as nerves on exam days, which teachers could not so readily predict. This was no small 
problem: a slight inflation had the power to throw university admissions significantly out of 
whack across the country, with the numbers of students now qualified to attend their top 
choice institutions outnumbering available places.  
 
How to solve this dilemma? Enter the Ofqual algorithm. Now widely decried as 
“shockingly unfair”, this algorithm downgraded nearly 40% of all A-Level results across the 
country, using a method that privileged a school’s past performance over student effort or 
teachers’ predictions. This meant that a bright, hardworking student from an underperforming 
school (or even a very recently improved one) would likely have their results downgraded. 
Students from better-funded private schools, which tend to have strong exam results, would 
have been less likely to be downgraded. The algorithm even failed some students simply 
because, based on the school’s performance over the past three years, it should have had at 
least one fail from the current year. Widespread student protests, featuring spot-on slogans 
like “Fuck the Algorithm”, eventually forced the government into yet another embarrassing 
U-turn: they dropped the downgraded results and went back to the teacher’s predictions. One 
student, interviewed on BBC Newsnight about the exams debacle, remarked that Gavin 
Williamson, the Conservative Secretary of State for Education who presided over the fiasco, 
clearly hadn’t considered what it might be like to be downgraded by an algorithm, having 
one’s life chances cut short simply for studying at a disadvantaged school; surely, society 
would be far better run by politicians who had the empathy and imagination to think beyond 
the bounds of their own privilege. 
 
The students’ incisive slogans and clear-sighted commentary pointed toward 
something shared by many scholars: a concern for the politics of automated predictions. As 
Louise Amoore, one of the most astute critics of computational predictive methods, put it in 
an op-ed for The Guardian, “the Ofqual algorithm was the technical embodiment of a deeply 
political idea: that a person is only as good as their circumstances dictate.” While it was never 
going to be possible to perfectly predict the grades, at least the teachers had openly debated 
the fairest methodologies. The algorithm, on the other hand, was ill-conceived and 
unaccountable. Its logic, as Amoore writes, “runs counter to democratic politics, which 
express the contingency of the world and the deliberative nature of collective decision-
making.”  
 
The Ofqual algorithm, a relatively simple methodology, had a serious design flaw 
(baking in previous school attainment bias) and devastatingly real consequences. The anger at 
its failure, however, points beyond the 2020 grading fiasco, toward a wider field of ever more 
opaque and unaccountable predictive apparatuses, which all too often – funnily enough – 
seem predisposed to exacerbate existing inequalities. This theme recurs in many important 
critiques of predictive methodologies and algorithmic governance.1  
 
The pervasive tendency for predictive algorithms – from the relatively simple to the 
most complex, black-boxed, machine learning methods – certainly bears critiquing. But 
there’s another dimension to the Ofqual algorithm that merits further analysis: the tense 
structures implied by their modes of prediction. The exam algorithm was not predicting in the 
simple future tense – what will happen, what might happen, what could happen – as 
predictive apparatuses often do. They were positing a much more grammatically, temporally 
and conceptually complex proposition: if the exams had gone ahead, what would this student 
have gotten? Or, to put it slightly differently: What was to have happened with the exam 
results?  
 
The first construction – what would have happened? – is sometimes referred to in 
English grammar as a Type 3 conditional, or a past unreal conditional sentence. That means a 
counterfactual or hypothetical claim with its main, if clause rendered in the past perfect (if x 
had happened), and its subordinate then clause in the perfect conditional (then y would have 
happened). The latter – what was to have happened? – is even more complex. It’s similar to 
the past unreal conditional, in that it looks back from the vantage point of the present, to a 
moment in the past which seemed to have had a different future laid out before it – except 
that a turn of events came along, which made this moment’s apparent future impossible to 
carry out. Yet, “What was to have happened?” absolutizes the past unreal conditional 
proposition, layering it with a normative expectation of inevitability that has since been 
thwarted. “Was to have” veers toward “should” – as if a certain cancelled future, having 
seemed nigh on inevitable, was the one that was supposed to play out in the first place. A 
once-assumed inevitability has, in spite of itself, been eclipsed.  
 
 Perhaps it could be said that this tense structure represents something of an anomaly 
within the vast field of predictive apparatuses (computational and otherwise) that pervasively 
operationalize the future, in this moment variously labelled the ‘age of big data’, or the ‘age 
of financialized capitalism’. To be fair, it’s a ‘highly unusual’ year (even if ‘highly unusual’ 
seems set to become all the more usual in coming years). It’s highly unusual that the grades 
that would have been are yet still needed, to oil the machine of meted-out merits opening 
apertures of admission and progression on which a society’s quasi-meritocratic signature 
flow of cultivated talents, expectations, lives, and fates has been built. It’s not normal that 
grades would have had to be predicted in this way. Surely, it might be said, the vast majority 
of the myriad predictive apparatuses instrumental to financialized “risk societies” (to borrow 
Ulrich Beck’s term) and embedded in daily life presume simpler forms of futurity, however 
complex they may be. When calculating the value of a derivative contract, or deciding who is 
a viable credit risk, questions of what will likely happen – or even (in possibilistic, rather than 
probabilistic valuation models), what could happen – are the norm and not the exception. The 
simpler future tenses hold – even if (as Randy Martin so eloquently argued in Knowledge 
LTD: Toward a Social Logic of the Derivative, 2015) the predictive models that posit them 
constantly come up against the edges of their own performativity, skewing the very fields of 
futurity in which they purport to be mere observers, and thus reaching the inherent limits of 
the knowledge they claim to produce. The simpler future tenses hold – even if, as Joshua 
Ramey argued in Politics of Divination (2016), neoliberalism profoundly profanes the 
impulse to divination, not so much predicting the future as extending today’s norms and 
expectations outwards, and thereby refashioning the future as a blank repetition of the 
demands of the present.  
 
Yet, I would like to argue, the “what was to have happened?” mode of prediction is 
coming into its own. Maybe it’s even emerging as a paradigmatic predictive modality of the 
coming decade. This absolutized mood of the past unreal conditional deserves much more 
attention in discussions of the predictive predilections of the present, for it is the very tense 
structure of the cancelled future.  
 
Once upon a time, the past unreal conditional tended to be expressed in terms of the 
personal life, focusing new forms of narrative attention on life paths that have remained 
unled. For instance, in The Jolly Corner (1908), Henry James writes an extended 
hallucination of a life unlived: a ghost version of his character Spencer Brydon, as he would 
have been, had he remained in New York throughout his adult life. As Peter Rawlings has 
argued, this narrative fascination with unled lives answers to increased class mobility in the 
modern period. The newfound focus on what lives could have been voiced the increased 
range of choices and dilemmas that accrued around the life path.  
 
 What of the absolutized past unreal conditional now? On the one hand, we might say 
that predictive apparatuses – which sometimes find themselves veering into the past unreal 
conditional – actualize life paths and leave others unled on an industrial scale. The exams 
debacle reveals the strange, bell-curve thinking that metes out opportunity, and ferries 
between the contradicting plutocratic and meritocratic connotations of narratives of 
achievement that form in the face of increasingly unequal societies. On the other hand, 
however, we might say that, given the level of mass-scale, infrastructural, financial and 
environmental collapse that seems to be coming, the tenses of the cancelled future take on a 
profoundly different resonance: departing altogether from the scale of personal uncertainty 
and upheaval in a few, relatively privileged, narrated lives, and veering toward 
infrastructural, political, societal breakdown. How do you calculate insurance for industries 
that have backed themselves into an ecological corner, depleting the stocks on which they 
depend to such an extent that they have rendered both themselves and their industrial-scale 
prey extinct? How do you underwrite a mortgage on a property anywhere near a coastline, 
where climate change-fuelled mass flooding is likely to pull the land under, one of these 
decades fairly soon? What do you do with prediction-fuelled markets, when the coronavirus 
pandemic has upended volatility hedge funds – the very funds designed to profit from 
turbulent market conditions? In a moment in which climate crisis invalidates insurance 
policies; volatility hedge funds are unable to deal with the volatility caused by the 
coronavirus pandemic; and permanent jobs become ever scarcer, I wouldn’t be surprised at 
all to find more algorithms fumbling around in the past unreal conditional – trying to mete 
out what was to have happened in compensation for a systems breach, attempting to keep 
things running as they should have, might have, were to have been – in spite of the pesky 
quagmires of the present that made it impossible for the all-but-expected advances to have 
been won. Fishing around in the past unreal conditional becomes a necessary condition for 
prediction in the present: necessary insofar as it’s needed to feed in inputs that keep the 
current systems running – for a little while longer at least – in spite of the burgeoning sense 
that these systems might otherwise have already expired. 
 
 In an essay on art and algorithms, Timotheus Vermeulen argued that, while many 
algorithms operate in the “what if?” mode – departing from a known present in search of a 
possible future – some artists (and others) have worked with what Vermeulen terms 
altergorithms: algorithms that enact an as if mode of thinking. Starting from an actual future 
– as if it were this way – they then find paths from this future back toward the virtual present, 
toward “uncertain and unstable points of departure.” I like this hopeful predictive modality, 
this subjunctive-predictive mood that Vermeulen points to. But it’s important, I think, to 
situate this subjunctive form of searching in relation to the more exhausted, cancelled modes 
of futurity that belong to the past unreal conditional. The “what was to have happened?” 
mode of prediction is witness to the collapse of system regularities and the (cruelly 
optimistic?) dreams that found themselves, perhaps unwittingly, entangled in their cogs. In a 
moment that seems (if I had to predict) poised to produce much more wide-scale trauma in 
the coming years, with climate breakdown, climate apartheid, a pandemic and its financial 
meltdowns, and ever-grosser levels of wealth inequality heading this way, and hitting the 
world’s already disadvantaged far harder in the process, perhaps one must start from the 
traumatized, shell-shocked predictive mode of the “was to have happened?” – the impetus to 
simply grease the cogs, to try to keep things going for a little while longer. Perhaps one must 
start from this, and try to think of the was to have happened as a traumatized predictive mode 
that seeks to smooth over the impossibility of this present, seen as simply the sum of the 
past’s predictions. Doing so might clear the ground, for trying to think of the present as 





1 See Against Prediction (2007) by Bernard Harcourt, Frank Pasquale’s Black Box Society 
(2016) or Cathy O’Neill’s Weapons of Math Destruction (2016).  
 
